Projekt

Contrary to the classical view in philosophy and cognitive sciences, recent accounts in philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience view thoughts not as a special kind of mental representation, but as motor representations that are not systematically different from those involved in motor processes. In particular, these accounts propose that thoughts might be generated, controlled and modified in the same way as motor processes, that is, by resorting to internal comparator mechanisms, which would compare intentions to think with the actual thoughts in the stream of consciousness ("thought comparators"). The present project yields at critically scrutinizing the motor account of thoughts in more detail, both on empirical and on conceptual grounds. It will in particular (i) compare recent motor accounts of thoughts with classical cognitive accounts, thereby developing a genuinely new non-motor, naturalistic framework of thoughts. (ii) It will probe the postulated "thought comparator" by testing its two main functions: to provide authorship of thoughts and to allow accurate thought generation. While the former function will be tested by an analysis of the phenomenon of thought insertion in schizophrenia patients, the latter function will be explored by a neuropsychological study about potential "dysmetria of thought" in cerebellar patients.

• Prof. Dr. Gottfried Vosgerau

  Universität Düsseldorf
  Philosophische Fakultät
  Institut für Philosophie
  Düsseldorf
  

• Dr. Matthis Synofzik

  Universität Tübingen
  Hertie-Institut für Klinische Hirnforschung
  Abteilung für Neurodegeneration &
  Abteilung für Kognitive Neurologie
  Tübingen